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be liable under Section 59-a for that states that "the auto truck or
auto tractor and the trailer or semi-trailer shall be deemed one vehicle
and the operator * * * shall be deemed the agent of each." 36 In other
words, the owner of the truck is constituted the agent of the trailerowner, while he is driving the vehicle. Furthermore, Section 59-a is
titled "Joint liability of separate owners * * * for negligence of
operator" as contrasted with Section 59 which is headed "Negligence
of operator other than owner attributable to owner." (Italics ours.)
Besides, the Leppard case proceeded on the theory that liability should
not be placed on "one who could not prevent or control the use or
operation of his car by withholding permission." 37 It is clear that
this contention and argument would not be applicable in trailer cases,
for such permission may be withheld by either the truck-owner as to
his truck, or the trailer-owner as to his trailer.
In all, Section 59-a of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, as
part of the legislative scheme to prevent accidents (by making owners
more prudent in renting or otherwise loaning their vehicles to others)
and to give those injured by moving vehicles a more adequate remedy
(extra parties to sue), is a very salutary enactment. It shows the
progress of the law and engenders the belief that, if new exigencies
occur, the Legislature is on hand to do its duty, and cure any defect
by an appropriate remedy.
ALFRED

EXAMINATION BY PSYCHIATRISTS IN

CRIMINAL

M.

ASCIONE.

CAsES.-When-

ever a power of appointment is delegated to or authority conferred
upon individuals, nepotism or favoritism will, to a certain degree, be
found to prevail as a result of the exercise of the power or authority.
The human element to be contended with in public administration is
the tendency on the part of the officials to bestow patronage in consideration of family or political relationship rather than in consideration of merit. Such evils have been found to exist in the appointments of lunacy commissions in criminal cases. The Legislature by
a recent enactment has endeavored to improve the situation 1 by an
act abolishing court-appointed lunacy commissions. Prior to 1936, a
statute 2 authorized the judges in criminal cases to appoint lunacy
commissions consisting of "three disinterested persons". To alleviate
the growing scandals in having unqualified persons appointed as members of a lunacy commission under such a provision, the Legislature
36 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW

§ 59-a.

37 225 App. Div. at 165, 232 N. Y. Supp. at 457.

870.

1N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 861; N. Y.
IN.

Y. Laws 1933, c. 564.

CODE OF CRIM.

PROC. §§ 658-662(d) and
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in 1936 passed an Act 3 providing that at least one of the three commissioners be a "qualified psychiatrist" and at least one a lawyer. But
the enactment failed to produce the desired results. Party patronage
ruled the appointments to lunacy commissions, and extravagance was
4
reaching its peak as the number of lunacy examinations increased.
The new Act 5 has been drafted by Senator Desmond on the
theory that to cure effectively the condition in reference to lunacy
commissions, the legislation "should assure scientifically accurate examination of sanity in'the most expeditious manner at the least cost
to the taxpayer." 6 To effectuate this purpose the Act provides:
(a) for the elimination of court-appointed lunacy commissions; 7
I
(b) for examination by psychiatrists employed in public hospitals; 8
(c) for the restriction of psychiatric examinations to determination of sanity at time of the trial; 9
(d) for completely restating and making flexible the provisions
regarding
sanity examination procedure in the minor
0
courts.'
For the purposes of this discussion the Act will be considered
under these four divisions.
I.
Wherever democracy prevails there will be found constitutional
provisions which accord to an individual charged with the commission
3 N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 460.
4 See Desmond, New York Smwshes the Lunacy Commission "Racket"
(1939) 96 AM. 3. oF PsYCHARY.
Lunacy Commission Expenditures and Appointments
in New York City from 1930-1938 inclusive.
County
Expenditures
Members
Kings
$1,093,900
4,264

New York
Bronx
Richmond
Queens

456,339
182,580
2,100

2,038
721
8
-o-

Thus, from 1930-1938, inclusive, New York City spent $1,734,899 on 7,031
lunacy commission appointments.
5
N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §§ 68-662(d) and § 870.
6 Desmond, loc. cit. supra note 4.
7 N. Y. CODE OF CaIM. PROC. § 659.
8Id. §§ 659-660.
9 Id. § 658.

10 Id. § 870.
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of a crime the right to a trial by jury n-the right to hear the accusation against him and the right not to be penalized for his social
transgressions unless found guilty, by his peers, beyond a reasonable
doubt. 12

However, it would be clearly inhuman and unjust to place

an accused person on trial and pass judgment upon him where such
a person is so mentally diseased, at the time"of the trial, as to impair
sufficiently his reasoning faculties so that he is rendered incapable of
understanding the proceeding or making his defense. 13 It is upon
this principle that the present Act 14 and its predecessor legislation
have been predicated. 15
The new Act provides that, if at any time before final judgment
the court, having jurisdiction over a defendant indicted for any crime,
reasonably believes that the defendant is so insane as to be incapableof understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings, or of making
his defense, or if the defendant makes a plea of insanity to the indictment, the court upon its own motion, or that of the prosecutor, or the
defendant, mnay in its discretion 16 order the examination of such a defendant to determine the question of his sanity.' 7

It further provides

that the examination be made in the following manner: in New York
City, the director of the division of psychiatry in the City Department
of Hospitals, upon the request of a court, must cause an examination
to be made by two qualified psychiatrists,' 8 designated from the staff
of the division.19 No fees will be received by the psychiatrists, for
11 N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
12 Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910) ; People v.
Barker, 153 N. Y. 111, 47 N. E. 31 (1897).
13 People v. Nyhan, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466 (1918).
See Freeman v. People,
4 Denio 9, 19 (N. Y. 1847) (where it is stated that Blackstone once wrote
"' * * * and if, after judgment, he becomes of non sane memory execution shall
be stayed, for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the
prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of
judgment or execution'") ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1120 (which is declaratory of
the common law, provides: "* * * A person cannot be tried, sentenced to any
punishment or punished for a crime while he is in a state of idiocy, imbecility,
lunacy or insanity so as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or
making his defense").
14 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 861; N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. Peoc. §§ 658-662(d) and

870.

15 See People v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159, 266 N. Y. Supp. 844 (1933)
(where Collins, J., exhaustively reviews the statutory and case law relating to
the question of the sanity of a defendant at the time of the trial).
16 Under the repealed Act it was held in People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y.
596, 26 N. E. 929 (1891), that where the court is satisfied, from its own observation and the information at hand, that there is no proper ground for questioning the defendant's sanity, then the defendant is not entitled to demand, as a
matter of right, an examination of his present mental condition.
17 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 658.
18 Of whom the director may be one. In New York City, the examining
psychiatrists will come from Bellevue Hospital. N. Y. CODE OF Cium. PROC
§ 661 (provides that "Before commencing his duties hereunder each psychiatrist
designated to make an examination ordered by the court shall take the oath
prescribed by the civil practice act to be taken by referees **
19 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 659.
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the work performed by them will be a part of their regular duties as
members of the staff of the city hospital.2 0 This eliminates the former
expenditures incurred in paying fees to members of lunacy commissions who in most instances were not even psychiatrists. However,
because of the unavailability of staff psychiatrists in other parts of the
state, the procedure slightly differs in places other than New York
City. Outside of New York City, the superintendent of a hospital
supported out of the funds of the state or any political subdivision
thereof, having psychiatric service and being certified by the state
commissioner of mental hygiene as having adequate facilities for such
an examination, must direct such an examination to be made, by
designating from the staff of such hospital two qualified psychiatrists

21

to make the same.2 2 Thus, under the present law the judges

will have no choice in selecting the examiners, the matter being left
entirely to the judgment of the hospital superintendent
or, in New
23
York City, the director of the division of psychiatry.
Under the repealed Act a court, feeling that a formal inquiry into
the sanity of a defendant was necessary, could appoint one of two
types of commissions. One of these was a commission composed 2of4
a lawyer, psychiatrist and some third person, usually a layman.
Under a commission of this type, formal hearings, with counsel representing both sides, the receiving of testimony in accordance with the
rules of evidence, and any necessary medical examinations were had.
The second type of a commission consisted of two physicians, who
had at least five years' experience in actual practice, and one of whom
was a qualified psychiatrist, and contemplated purely medical examinations, which did not depend on the taking of formal evidence, but
were based almost entirely on psychiatric clinical diagnosis. 25 The
former type of a commission, however, was the one most frequently
20 Id. § 662(c) (Notice that the statute limits the payment of fees to psychiatrists outside of New York City to reasonable traveling expenses "and a
fee of ten dollars for each examination of the defendant but not exceeding fifty
dollars in fees in any one case").
21 Of whom he may be one. Under the former Act the finding of two of
the three commissioners was sufficient. Now, where only two psychiatrists are
to be appointed to make the inquiry, it is provided that if they disagree in their
findings the proceedings against the defendant may be resumed or the court may
request the Superintendent of Hospitals, or the director of the Division of
Psychiatry in New York City, to appoint a third psychiatrist to examine the
defendant and submit a report to the court.
22 N. Y. CODF OF CRIM. PROC. § 659 (" * * * or if two such qualified psychiatrists cannot be designated from the staff of the hospital, the superintendent
may designate any qualified psychiatrist in the state").
23 However, the Act does not usurp the functions of the court. Although
it does deprive the courts of the power to appoint persons to examine a defendant as to his sanity, yet the report of the psychiatrists is purely advisory. The
court still has the right to disagree with the conclusions of the psychiatrists, in
which case the criminal proceedings against the defendant are resumed. See
Desmond, loc. cit. supra note 4.
24 N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 460, § 658.
25 N.

Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 870.
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employed. The new Act, however, provides but for one form of commission, which is free to determine for itself which course of procedure it will follow, and it may elect to pursue the elements of both
former methods.26
It undoubtedly was the intention of the Legislature, although not
clearly expressed, to assure to a defendant a scientific procedure in
determining his sanity and to avoid the obstacles usually presented
in having formal hearings with stenographers taking notes, with both
sides being represented by counsel and the defendant's counsel urging
the defendant not to answer certain questions, all of which tended to
prevent a proper determination of the defendant's state of mind. 27
Nevertheless, in contravention of this intention, it was recently held
that such formal hearings, should be continued under the new Act, and
that the courts will continue to place at the disposal of the psychiato such hearings, including
trists all the facilities of the court incident
28
clerks, attaches and stenographers.
II.
Immediately after the new Act took effect a question was suggested as to the nodus operandi to be pursued under the Act. 29 The
old statute authorized the county court to commit a defendant for an
informal observation "as an aid" in determining whether "sufficient
and satisfactory proof" existed to warrant it in believing the defendant insane and accordingly making or denying an order for a formal
lunacy proceeding.3 0 Because the repealing Act eliminates the phrases
quoted in the preceding sentence and merely provides for a formal
examination, 31 the question posed is whether the new Act intended
26
27

28

People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 328, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 221 (1939).
Desmond, loc. cit. supra note 4.
People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 327, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 220 (1939).

However, it is not to be taken that the psychiatrists are not to gather any
information, at all, concerning the defendant. It is only that they are not to be
hampered by any rules of evidence or by counsel either for the People or the
defense. Although no counsel is to interfere with the psychiatrists, the interests
of the defendant and the state would, nevertheless, be sufficiently protected, for

the Act provides that the court may not commit a defendant as insane until the
district attorney and counsel for the defendant have been accorded an opportunity to be heard. The psychiatrists are also given the power of subpoena and
are authorized to examine witnesses and receive such other information as may
aid them in making a finding. Indeed, such powers are essential to any adequate
inquiry as to defendant's mental state. Before such a fact can be properly
determined, the psychiatrist must, in many cases, have information as to the
defendant's heredity, early environment, conditions in his family, sociological
background, previous medical history, and many other facts. See N. Y. CoDE
OF CRIM. PROC. § 661.
29 People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 333, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 225 (1939).
30 N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 460, § 658.

31 N. Y.

CODE OF CRIM. PROC.

§ 660 ("The psychiatrists so designated shall

forthwith examine the defendant. Examinations may be made in the place
where the defendant is detained, or, upon recommendation of said superintendent or director the court may commit the defendant for a reasonable period
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to limit the court in the first instance to the making of orders calling
for elaborate psychiatric examinations only, thereby depriving the
court of the power to commit for preliminary hospital examination.
In the light of the trend of decisions 32 and statutory enactments which
establish the rule that procedural enactments must be construed as
intending to aid and not hamper the courts in their exercise of sound
discretion, it would be a strained interpretation to hold that the Act
abrogates the court's power to direct an informal examination as an
aid preliminary to its determination whether a special proceeding "de
lunatico inquirendo" should be ordered. 3 Indeed, to hold otherwise
would be to close our eyes to the prevailing practice in the county
courts, where during a trial the defendant's counsel, at times, orally
informs the court that the defendant's acts manifest insanity, or
pleads insanity with a specification for the appointment of a commission, or, at times, the district attorney, entertaining a doubt as to the
defendant's sanity, informs the court of the apparent abnormality of
the accused. In such cases, upon such casual information it would
be unreasonable for the court in "precipitately concluding" that there
is reasonable ground for ordering a formal lunacy inquisition.3 4 Moreover, to order formal examinations freely requiring the members of
hospital staffs to act as referees, would be to interfere with the performance of their ordinary duties and to overtax the hospital facilities, or to require an unwarranted increase in their personnel.8 5
Thus, the ineluctable conclusion is that the Legislature could not have
intended to abrogate the power to order a preliminary examination
as inherent in the court or as given to it by the Mental Hygiene
Law.36
III.
Whenever a court orders a formal proceeding "de lunatico inquirendo", the psychiatrists are limited under this Act, just as they
have been under the former Act, to make their findings with reference
for observation and examination to such hospital as may be designated by such
superintendent or director * * ").
32 People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596, 26 N. E. 929 (1891); People v.
Whitman, 149 Misc. 159, 266 N. Y. Supp. 844 (1933).
33People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 332, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 224 (1939).
34
Id.at 334, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) at 226.

This would entail an additional expenditure, which the Act seeks to
See Desmond, loc. cit. szapra note 4.
36 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81, subd. 5. N. Y. CODE OF CRIm. PROC.
35

curtail.

§ 662(d) seemingly to the contrary, notwithstanding. See People v. Pershaec,

172 Misc. 324, 335, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 227 (1939) (Even if after a preliminary examination is had and it is determined that further examination by a
commission is necessary, no time would have been lost, for the findings as a
result of the hospital examination could be fully utilized by the designated commission. Indeed, "even a casual clinical examination of the defendant aids the
designating l ospital authority in selecting those members of his staff best
equipped by experience and specializAtion for the particular case").
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to the prisoner's sanity as the term is understood in medical science,3 7
i.e., to determine his ability to appreciate the nature of the trial and
to make his defense; and are not to determine the accused's sanity
in the legal sense, i.e., sanity touching on the question of criminal responsibility, or the capacity to know the nature of one's act and its
wrongfulness. 38 If the Act called for the determination of the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime, then the
Legislature would have been sanctioning the usurpation by psychopathology of the powers of the jury and consequently the Act would
have been unconstitutional. 9 A defendant has the constitutional right
to a jury trial on all the issues of the case, and his mental capacity
to commit the crime is one of the essential elements of the crime (to
wit, the nens rea), upon which a defendant is entitled to a jury ver40
dict and is not to be bound by the determination of some commission.
Thus, we see that the Act was not intended to eliminate the
classic "battle of experts". The evils of bought "expert" testimony,
and the partisan nature of the expert's services, and the unsoundness
of the use of hypothetical questions calculated to support the questioner's side of the case will still continue. 41 As long as the right
of the accused to summon in his behalf any witness-a right peculiar
to the common law, and one which ought to be cherished-continues,
42
we shall be confronted with the "battle of experts" problem.
37 See People v. Nyhan, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466 (1918). "There is a distinction between insanity as the term is understood in medical science and insanity
as the term is understood in legal science, so as to relieve a defendant from
criminal responsibility. A person may be insane as that term is ordinarily
understood, and still be responsible for the commission of a crime. The word
'insane' as employed in the statute does not mean criminal irresponsibility, but
so mentally diseased as to impair his reasoning faculties sufficiently to render it
inhuman and unjust to place him upon trial." In that case it was held that a
police officer, indicted for the murder of his wife, who had hallucinations of
hearing and fixed delusions of persecution in connection with the crime of which
he was accused, is incapable of appreciating the proceedings of a trial and
making his defense, and should be committed to a hospital until he becomes
sane, and then placed on trial.
38 N. Y. CODE OF Clm. PRoc. § 662 ("The report of the psychiatrist made
pursuant to this section shall not be received in evidence upon the trial of the
defendant but shall be filed by the court in the office of the clerk of the court
where it shall be subject to inspection only on an order of the court or a justice
thereof").
. 39 State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) ; Sinclair v. State, 161
Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931). See People v. Nyhan, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466
(1918) (Where under the former Act, which authorized the lunacy commissions
to determine the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
crime as well as at the time of the trial, it was held that the provision did not
refer to the criminal responsibility of the prisoner, but to the condition of his
mind and reason with reference to his ability to understand the proceedings and
make his defense).
40 State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
4' Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of Criminal Defendants Before Trial (1935) 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
419, 420.
42 Ibid. (This problem "is not peculiar to the field of psychiatry, but permeates the entire legal system wherever expert testimony is employed").
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Undoubtedly, it would have been a welcomed feature of the Act
had it required the psychiatrist's report, finding the defendant insane
at the time of the trial, to be binding on the jury even with reference
to the defendant's mental responsibility for the crime charged, so as
to nolle prosse the indictment and fully discharge him upon his regaining his mental health; 43 but if the psychiatrists found the defendant sane such report would have no evidentiary value. In cases
where a defendant is found insane at the time of the trial, and if the
examinations were not made too late after the commission of the
act charged, it is not a too remote circumstance to consider the insanity, subsequent to the commission of the offense, from which its
existence at the time of the offense may be inferred, inasmuch as a
condition of mental disease is, more or less, continuous and does not
change appreciably within a short time. 44 To dismiss the indictment
in such a case would, besides being a blessing to the
congested courts,
45
add a further "virtue of economy" to the statute.
IV.

Upon first reading the provisions of the Act it appears to be applicable to the inferior courts 46 and giving it a literal construction,
it seems as if a drastic innovation in the prevailing practice and a
disruption of established procedure was intended to be effected by it.
However, upon a reflective reading in the light of established principles, it is realized that the Legislature had no such revolutionary
intent. The Act provides that "If at any time it shall appear to a
court having jurisdiction of a defendant charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor but not under indictment therefor or charged with an
offense not a crime",4 7 that the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature of a proceeding or of making his defense, the court
may stay the proceedings and order a formal examination of the
defendant.48 Undoubtedly, this provision referring to the "not under
indictment" type of cases is inapplicable to Courts of Special Sessions,
43 Id. at 435. Although the Act states that after a person, found insane at
the time of the trial, recovers his sanity he must be brought to trial or legally
discharged, yet it has been held under the repealed statute, which had a similar
provision, that the only effect of the proceeding, determining the defendant
insane at the trial, was to suspend the trial until the defendant had become sane,
and that it was error for the court to dispose of the indictment upon receiving
the psychiatrist's report finding the defendant insane. See N. Y. CODE OF
CRim. PROC. § 662(a) ; see also People ex rel. Mullen v. Coler, 61 App. Div.
538, 70 N. Y. Supp. 639 (2d Dept. 1910) ; People v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159,
266 N. Y. Supp. 844 (1933).
44 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 227; People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y.
398, 34 N. E. 275 (1893).
45 Note (1936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 204, 215. But see People v. Whitman,
149 Misc. 159, 166, 266 N. Y. Supp. 844, 852 (1933).
46 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 870.
47 " * * *

Law." Ibid.
48 Ibid.

other than a traffic infraction as defined by the Vehicle & Traffic
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because an information, which is equivalent to an indictment, is a
49
In other
condition precedent to Special Sessions jurisdiction.
words, a defendant cannot be within its jurisdiction unless he has
been held for Special Sessions.50 But, it is applicable to that part of
the Magistrate's Court, where the magistrate, acting as a "committing
officer", has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant "charged
with a felony" pending the grand jury's return of a true bill against
him." Thus, by a liberal construction of the statute, we would confer upon a magistrate, and outside of New York City, upon a justice
of the peace, the power, in felony cases, not only to order formal
lunacy inquisitions, but also to stay a criminal proceeding from the
time of the making of such order. 52 The rhetorical question has
been asked: "Could the Legislature possibly have had any such intention?" 53 Indeed, to pose the question is to answer it. The result
of such a construction would be an extension of a magistrate's power
into felony jurisdiction. This would be an usurpation of the constitutional jurisdiction of the trial courts.54 The Magistrate's Courts, being
inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, are empowered, in criminal cases,
to exercise only the jurisdiction of a committing magistrate, who must
hold a defendant for trial or grand jury if a prima face case exists.55
Although the State Constitution 'l suggests the possibility that the
Legislature could extend the province of the inferior courts so as to
vest in them a general felony jurisdiction as now exercised by the trial
courts, the Legislature must, at least, specifically say so in definite
language to effect such a serious change.5 7 Thus, as a matter of
"safe determination" a court of original jurisdiction would hold that
the Legislature did not intend to confer such felony jurisdiction on
49 People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 339, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 230 (1939) ;
see also People v. Kraft, 229 App. Div. 281, 242 N. Y. Supp. 348 (3d Dept.
1930).
5o People ex rel. Dembinsky v. Fox, 182 App. Div. 642, 168 N. Y. Supp.
1008 (1st Dept. 1918).
See People exc rel. Bungart v. Wells,
51 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 208.
57 App. Div. 140, 68 N. Y. S. 59 (2d Dept. 1907).
52 People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 340, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 231
(1939) (If such was the real intention of the legislature it would necessarily
"follow that in 'infamous crimes', such as murder in the first degree, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary, etc., it could possibly have the extreme effect of staying
all further proceedings, including even those of the grand jury, at least, until
the report of a commission designated by a director of psychiatry is received,
and then, assuming that he had the power, the magistrate could confirm, commit
and stay further proceedings, or reject their report *
53 Ibid.
54 People ex rel. Moore v. Warden of the City Prison, 150 App. Div. 644,
135 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1st Dept. 1912).
55 N. Y. INF. CRIA. CTs. Act §§ 130-133; People v. Citarelli, 247 App.
Div. 53, 286 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1st Dept. 1936); People v. Freer, 171 Misc. 478,
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 858 (1939).
56 N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 18 ("The Legislature shall not hereafter confer
upon any inferior or local court of its creation * * * any greater jurisdiction
*** than is conferred upon county courts by or under this article").
57 People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 342, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 233 (1939).
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the Magistrate's Courts, but rather intended to have that provision 58
apply only to those courts which possess jurisdiction over the felony
as well as the personal or custodial jurisdiction of the defendant. 59
Still, in another instance the statute states, rather clearly, that
where a defendant is "charged with an offense not a crime", the court
having jurisdiction over the defendant (i.e., the Magistrate's Court)
may order a psychiatric inquiry, if necessary.60 This provision injects
a unique feature into the Magistrate's Court in bestowing upon it the
power to order "de lu-tico inquirendo" proceedings, a right formerly
exercised only by "courts of superior jurisdiction". 1 Under the repealed Act, in cases of misdemeanors and lesser offenses, where the
accused showed signs of denentia, the practice in the Magistrate's
Courts was to commit him for an informal observation under the
Mental Hygiene Law, 62 and the hospital did the rest.63 In all probability, as a matter of expediency, the old well-established practice of
committing a person, "charged with an offense not a crime", for hospitalization under the Mental Hygiene Law 64 would be continued,
inasmuch as under the new Act it is not incumbent' upon the magistrates to order a formal lunacy inquisition, "as the only authorized
method." 65

Thus, as gathered from the foregoing discussion, the Desmond
Act has not abolished completely the procedure in lunacy investigations as developed under the repealed Act. The authors of the Act
intended to cure one glaring defect in the old statute. They have
designed the new Act especially to thwart the liberal practice of making unnecessary appointments of lunacy commissions, and thereby to
foster economy. However, there was no necessity for repealing the
entire former Act. The same purpose could have been effected
merely by amending the provision which permitted court-appointed
commissions.
EDWARD S. SZUKELEWICZ.

STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST THE CORPORATE RIGHT TO
PERSON.-The uncertainty in reference to a corporation's
right to appear in person, gave rise to a demand either for an absolute
decision by the New York Court of Appeals or for a statutory enactAPPEAR IN

58 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 870 ("If at any time it shall appear to a court
having jurisdiction of a defendant charged with a felony *** but not under
indictment therefor * * * ").
59 People v Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 340, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 231 (1939).
60 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 870, subd. 1.
61
People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 346, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 236 (1939).
62
N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81, subd. 5.
63 N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 460, § 870.
64 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 81, subd. 5.
65 People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 347, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 215, 237 (1939).

